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WILDLIFE CONSERVATION AND ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
ARE lliEY COMPATffiLE? 
Michael Hutchins1 and Christen Wemmer2 
Introduction 
In the history of Western civilization, nature was viewed primarily in 
utilitarian terms (Shaw 1974; White 1967). Wild animals were a source of 
food, clothing, and transportation, and wilderness was something to be 
"tamed" for the collective benefit of mankind. Indeed, the Biblical injunction 
from Genesis 9 was ''And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon 
every beast of the earth ... into your hands they are delivered." Within the 
last century, however, perceptions have begun to change. We have now seen 
the emergence of a broad-based coalition of individuals and organizations 
dedicated to the goal of preservation, rather than exploitation. The end result 
has been the formation of something completely novel to Western thought-
an environmental ethic. 
Aldo Leopold is universally recognized as the founding father of modern 
environmental ethics. His "land ethic" (Leopold 1949) is a classic statement 
of environmentalist philosophy, and one of the first to accord direct moral 
consideration to non-human animals (Callicott 1980). More recently, however, 
we have seen the emergence of a new ethical tradition, known as "animal 
rights" or "animal liberation" (Singer 1975; Regan 1983; Midgley 1983). This 
movement is a variation of the humane ethic, which seeks to eliminate the 
pain and suffering of non-human animals, especially that which results from 
human cruelty and indifference. Radical animal liberationists draw heavily 
upon the metaphors of political liberalism, claiming that animals, not unlike 
women and racial minorities, should be accorded equal rights, regardless 
of species. Extremists have demanded equal moral consideration for farm 
animals and other "enslaved and oppressed" non-human beings (Singer 
1975; Regan 1983). 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the philosophical tenets of the 
animal rights/humane ethic as they relate to the environmental ethic and, 
more specifically, as they relate to wildlife management and conservation. 
The two ethics will be compared in an effort to identify potential sources 
of conflict. Recent criticisms of the animal rights ethic, most notably by Fox 
(1978, 1979), Rodman (1977), Callicott (1980), Gunn (1980), and Hutchins 
et al. (1982) have identified several major discrepancies. The implications 
of these differences will be discussed. 
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Environmental Ethics and Animal Rights 
Before discussing potential sources of conflict between the environmental! 
conservation and animal rights/humane ethics, it will first be necessary to 
examine the two viewpoints in more detail. Both ethics share a concern for 
wild animals. Differences between the two can best be understood through 
a closer examination of their reasoning. 
The primary goal of the environmental/conservation ethic is to preserve 
naturally occurring biological diversity (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; Gunn 1980; 
Myers 1980). The term "natural" is used here to distinguish between diversity 
that has occurred as a result of natural evolutionary/ecological processes (i.e., 
speciation, colonization, "natural" extinctions), and that which has occurred 
because of recent human interventions (i.e., species introductions, human-
caused extinctions). Aldo Leopold once said that ''A thing is right if it tends 
to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is 
wrong when it tends to do otherwise" (Leopold 1949). Thus, the biological 
richness of an ecosystem, as characterized by the number and variety of 
species it supports, is seen as intrinsically good. Conversely, changes in 
naturally occurring biological diversity that occur as a result of human 
activities (either directly or indirectly) are perceived as intrinsic evils. Note 
that it is naturally occurring diversity that is important here, rather than 
absolute numbers of species. Tundra, for example, is relatively devoid of 
life when compared with tropical rain forest. However, it does support a 
characteristic assemblage of species, and, according to the environmental/con-
servation ethic, it is this naturally occurring biotic community which should 
be preserved. The reader should also recognize that the aim of conservation 
is not to prevent change-ecosystems and species will change even in the 
absence of human interference. Indeed, evolution through natural selection 
is a dynamic, rather than a static process. According to Ehrenfeld (1972, p.7), 
the broad goal of conservation is " ... to ensure that nothing in the existing 
natural order is permitted to become permanently lost as the result of man's 
activities except in the most unusual and carefully examined circumstances." 
Some exceptions have been made, for example, in the case of certain disease 
organisms, such as smallpox (Fenner 1980). 
Species or ecosystems do not warrant moral consideration according to 
the animal rights/humane ethic, although they may be said to have "inherent 
value" (Feinberg 1978; Regan 1983). Thus, the humane moralists argue that 
individual organisms, rather than species or ecosystems, should be the focus 
of our ethical concerns. Furthermore, they argue that sentience-the capacity 
to experience pain- is the only relevant characteristic needed by organisms 
to merit full moral consideration (Singer 1975; Regan 1983). They contend 
that if non-human animals have the capacity to experience pain, then their 
suffering should be as important a matter of ethical concern as that of our 
fellow humans. That non-human animals may be incapable of reason, speech, 
forethought, or self awareness is considered irrelevant. After all, some classes 
of humans, (e.g., infants, and the severely mentally retarded) do not possess 
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these abilities, and yet are accorded rights. The argument dut human needs 
should take precedence over those of sentient non-humans is viewed as 
"speciesism"-a form of prejudice analogous to chauvinism, racism, or sexism 
(Singer 1975; Regan 1983; Midgley 1983). Thus, individual animals are seen 
a..'i having a "right to life" and, except in very special cases, any attempt to 
kill them or to cause them to suffer pain is considered to be morally 
unjustifiable. The logical consequence of such an ethic is, of course, obligatory 
vegetarianism (Regan 1983; Singer 1975). (However, note that eating carrion 
does not involve the voluntary infliction of pain or death, and apparently 
would not be restricted by the animal rights/humane ethic.) 
In this regard, it is important to recognize several degrees of rigor in the 
interpretation of the animal rights/welfare doctrine. Adherents to the most 
extreme view contend that there are few circumstances that could justifY the 
killing of sentient animals by humans (Singer 1975; Regan 1983; Midgley 
1983). However, the more liberal view is that humane and painless killing 
of animals is sometimes a regrettable necessity. The Humane Society of the 
United States, for instance, advocates the humane disposal of homeless dogs 
and cats. Implicit in such a policy is the assumption that death is a better 
alternative than the marginal quality of life these animals would experience-
cone to a lack of human care and companionship (Wright 1978). 
At first glance, the philosophical bases of the environmental/conservation 
ethic and the animal rights/humane ethic seem compatible. The welfare of 
animals has been a concern of both, but despite this common ground, 
profound differences exist. Callicott (1980) has compared the "land ethic" 
of Aldo Leopold (1949) with the "humane ethic" of Peter Singer (1975). 
While only sentient animals are afforded moral standing according to the 
humane ethic, the land ethic is more holistic, focusing not only on animals 
(both sentient and non-sentient), but also on plants, soils, waters, and other 
non-living things. While philosophical differences exist within various factions 
of both the environmental/conservation and the animal rights/welfare move-
ments, we see their radically divergent emphasis on the individual as opposed 
to the population, species, or ecosystem as a crucial issue. 
Ideological differences between the two ethics are evident in their contrast-
ing view of the endangered species problem. \X?hile both ethics favor saving 
endangered animals, they differ in their reasons for doing so. Regan (1983, 
p. 360) argues that we should conserve endangered species " ... not because 
the species is endangered, but because the individual animals have valid 
claims, and thus rights against those who would destroy their natural habitat, 
for example, or who would make a living off their dead carcasses through 
poaching and traffic in exotic animals, practices which unjustifiably override 
the rights of these animals." Thus, all sentient animals, regardless of species, 
rarity or other considerations, are to be given equal moral consideration 
according to the rights view. 
In contrast, proponents of the environmental/conservation ethic argue that 
endangered species should be given special status solely because of their 
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scarcity (Gunn 1980). That is, extraordinary efforts should be made to preserve 
rare species, especially when an organism has become rare due to some 
action on the part of humans (e.g., as a result of pollution, habitat alteration, 
or over-hunting). This follows from the underlying rationale that naturally-
occurring biological diversity is intrinsically good, and that it provides a 
measure of the "health" of an entire ecosystem (Leopold 1949). Again, the 
focus is on the population, species, or ecosystem as a whole, rather than on 
individual organisms. There is a political element at play here as well. To 
the conservationist, endangered species have become representatives of the 
process of habitat degradation. While complexity in natural ecosystems is 
generally sufficient to weather the loss of some species before checks and 
balances are thrown out of equilibrium, it would be politically unwise to 
forego any loss of biological diversity without a fight. The recent controversy 
involving the snail darter is a case in point (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981).The 
environmental/conservation ethic is also based on the realization that the 
components of an ecosystem (both living and non-living) are often intricately 
interrelated, and that an instability in these elements can have far-reaching, 
and sometimes degrading consequences (Leopold 1949; Dasmann 1978; Fox 
1978; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981). 
Potential Sources of Conflict 
Clearly, the animal rights/humane ethic and the environmental/conserva-
tion ethic will lead to the same decisions in many situations. For example, 
both ethics would consider it wrong for humans to destroy wildlife habitat, 
or to pollute it with chemicals and wastes. But, when the two viewpoints 
are compared, it is evident that disagreements will arise when the "rights" 
of individual organisms come into conflict with the preservation of popula-
tions, species, or ecosystems. As Regan (1983, p. 361) has pointed out, one 
implication of the more holistic environmental/conservation ethic is" ... that 
the individual may be sacrificed for the greater biotic good." Regan opposes 
such actions, because they deny " ... the propriety of deciding what should 
be done to individuals who have rights by appeal to aggregative considera-
tions, including, therefore, computations about what will or will not maximally 
contribute to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community." 
Furthermore, he dismisses any attempt to subvert the rights of individual 
organisms to those of the species, or ecosystem as "environmental fascism." 
There are many circumstances in which the "rights" of individual organisms 
may come into conflict with the preservation of populations, species, or 
ecosystems. We have chosen three such cases for more detailed consideration: 
(1) Problems of population regulation, (2) Incentives for wildlife conserva-
tion, and (3) Conservation-related research that harms individual animals. 
Problems of Population Regulation 
The culling of wild animal populations is a particularly sensitive issue for 
proponents of both the animal rights/humane and environmental/conservation 
Wildlife Conservation 115 
ethics. Though their reasons may differ, proponents of both ethics are strongly 
opposed to the senseless killing of non-human animals. But what should be 
done in those situations where animals become too numerous for their own 
good, or for the good of the population, species, or ecosystem as a whole? 
Overpopulation is a difficult concept to define. The phrase "too many 
animals" does not do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon. Caughley 
(1981) recognizes four different classes of overpopulation: (1) the animals 
are threatening human life or livelihood, (2) the animals are depressing the 
densities of favored species, (3) the animals are too numerous for their own 
good, and ( 4) the system of plants and animals is not in equilibrium, thus 
resulting in an alteration of the entire ecosystem. Of the four classes of 
overpopulation, numbers 3 and 4 appear to have the most potential for 
generating conflict between the two ethics and will, therefore, be discussed 
in greater detail. 
When does a population of animals become too large for its own good? 
Generally, such a situation exists when individuals become so numerous 
that their habitat can no longer support them. An excellent example is 
provided by the Mule deer ( Odocoileus hemionus) inhabiting the Kaibab 
Plateau of northern Arizona (Rasmussen 1941). The plateau was set aside as 
a game reserve in 1906, and a program of predator removal was initiated to 
provide more deer for recreational hunters. During a 25-year period, over 
6,000 major predators were killed, including mountain lions, wolves, coyotes, 
and bobcats. The wolf (Canis lupus) was completely eliminated. 
Following the eradication of predators, the deer began to multiply rapidly 
The population, which had been estimated at 4,000 individuals in 1906, grew 
to between 60,000 and 70,000 individuals by 1923. As their numbers expanded, 
the animals overgrazed the vegetation, thus resulting in severe food shortages. 
In September, 1923, it was estimated that between 30,000 and 40,000 deer 
were starving. In 1925, the population "crashed" and nearly two-thirds of 
the herd died. By 1939, only 10,000 individuals remained. 
This pattern of rapid population growth, followed by an equally rapid 
decrease is known as an "eruption." Caughley (1976) suggested that eruptions 
are characteristic of populations of large herbivores. However, all recorded 
instances of this phenomenon in North America have been preceded by 
some form of human intervention (Peek 1980). The Kaibab deer, for instance, 
are a classical example of poor wildlife management; elimination of the 
deer's predators subsequently resulted in overpopulation, habitat degrada-
tion, and widespread starvation. Unfortunately, similar situations exist to this 
day in many parts of the continental U.S. (Iker 1983; Klein 1981). As a result, 
some wildlife managers and conservationists have recommended that popu-
lations of deer and other large herbivores be controlled through culling. 
Animal rights advocates, on the other hand, have traditionally been anti-hunting, 
and recent attempts to control animal populations by killing have been 
vigorously opposed, whether they be in national parks or on other federally 
controlled lands (e.g., Grandy 1982; The Humane Society News 1983). Indeed, 
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Regan (1983, p. 361) has stated that "With regard to wild animals, the policy 
recommended by the rights view is: let them be!" But what are the conse-
quences of inaction? 
When a population of herbivores overshoots its food resources, individual 
animals can be expected to suffer an increased starvation rate (Klein 1968; 
Leopold et al. 1947; McCullough 1979; Taylor and Hahn 1947). Moreover, 
such conditions also lead to increased mortality and suffering due to disease, 
parasitism, and aggression-related injuries (Cheatum 1951; Christian and Davis 
1964; Wilson and Hirst 1977). If a major goal of the animal rights/humane ethic 
is to reduce pain and suffering, then how can such situations be tolerated? 
Proponents of the animal rights/humane ethic may be suspicious of this 
argument, since it is the same one used to justify recreational hunting (Lyons 
1978; Hope 1974). However, the goals of the environmental/conservation 
ethic are different than those of the majority of wildlife managers and hunters. 
Wildlife managers are also considered among the environmentally aware. 
However, by definition, a manager is one who makes "judicious use of means 
to accomplish an end" (Webster's Seventh New World Collegiate Dictionary). 
Thus, wildlife managers make decisions which affect the environment, gen-
erally to favor the productivity of specific game animals. Furthermore, they 
tend to focus on disturbed rather than on natural environments, and view 
the cropping of overabundant animals as legitimate and necessary. Though 
the environmental/conservation ethic does not prohibit recreational hunting 
per se (National Wildlife 1971; Callicott 1980 ), it also does not condone 
widespread environmental manipulations that favor specific species at the 
expense of others. Many hunters and wildlife managers do not view such 
manipulations as being ecologically disruptive when, in fact, they often are 
(Hope 1974). 
In recent years, some biologists have argued for more noninterventional 
wildlife management policies, especially in larger national parks, i.e., those 
which contain relatively complete ecosystems (Houston 1971, 1982). Non-
interventional or "natural" management policies involve a "hands-off' attitude 
similar to that expounded by radical animal rights activists (e.g., Regan 1983). 
However, one result of such a policy is that natural regulatory processes are 
allowed to operate regardless of the consequences for individual animals. In 
Yellowstone National Park, for example, 200 bighorn sheep ( Ovis canadensis) 
recently contracted keratoconjunctivitis, an eye disease commonly known as 
pinkeye (Meagher 1982; Robbins 1984). Nearly 85% of these individuals 
became blind, and subsequently died as a result of starvation or injuries 
sustained during falls. Although the animals were admittedly suffering, Park 
Service oftlcials never considered treating them with antibiotics. Since the 
disease was considered to be naturally occurring, it would have conflicted 
with their policy of non-intervention. The philosophy espoused by the U.S. 
National Park Service is that pristine ecosystems exist in an equilibrium state 
in which human impact on energy flow should be minimized at all times 
(Houston 1971 ). The Park Service view is that humans should not interfere 
with the workings of nature, which are preceived in neutral terms, without 
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moral judgement (see Gould 1982). Not surprisingly, this and other recent 
decisions by wildlife managers have been highly controversial (Blonston 
1983; Chase 1986; Robbins 1984). 
Figure 1. When some bighorn sheep in Yellowstone National Park contracted a 
blinding eye disease, Park Service personnel made no attempt to intervene. One 
implication of non-interventional or "natural" management policies is that normal 
regulatory processes, such as disease and predation, are allowed to operate regardless 
of the consequences for individual animals. (Photo: Gerry Ellis) 
Despite Regan's (1983) plea that wild animals be left alone, it would seem 
that even non-interventional management policies might conflict with the 
rights ethic, or at least create that perception in the public mind. If we are 
to accept the proposition that all sentient beings have a "right to life," then 
the logical conclusion is that we should intervene in those cases in which 
sentient animals are suffering from starvation or disease (but, see Feinberg 
1978 for an alternative viewpoint). In fact, animal rights/welfare organizations 
are generally among the first to recommend supplemental feeding for under-
nourished wild animals (Grandy 1982; Iker 1983). However, such actions are 
often in conflict with the environmental/conservation ethic. Supplemental 
feeding may increase the probability that animal populations will eventually 
overshoot their food resources (figure 2; Robinson eta!. 1980). Furthermore, 
by concentrating the animals at feeding stations, such practices may also 
increase the incidence of disease, or intensify rates of habitat alteration 
(Madson 1986). The obvious danger in such a policy is that short-sighted 
empathy can lead to much greater suffering, not only for the animals of 
interest, but also for the ecological community as a whole (see Hardin 1974 
for a similar argument regarding human population problems). 
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Figure 2. Supplemental feeding of elk in Wyoming. Unless artificial feeding is com-
bined with a regular program of population reduction, the animals may overshoot 
their food resources, degrade their habitat, and suffer an increased rate of starvation. 
(Photo: john Wilbrecht, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.) 
The animal rights/humane ethic is clear on its position regarding human-
animal relationships, but it is unclear with regard to pain and suffering 
inflicted upon animals by animals (Hutchins et al. 1982). In general, the 
doctrine aims to limit human behavior with the objective of minimizing or 
eliminating human-caused pain or discomfort to other creatures. At least 
among some animal rights advocates, what predatory animals do to their 
prey is beyond the realm of concern, presumably because it is done by 
"innocent killers," lacking in malicious intent or knowledge of the ethical 
consequences of their actions (Regan 1983; Feinberg 1978). This is an 
enlightened view compared to attitudes of the past when the conduct of 
animals was morally appraised (Beach 1975), and predators, such a wolves, 
were persecuted as "blood-thirsty killers" or "allies of the devil" (Lopez 
1975). However, such arguments also open the animal rights movement to 
logical criticism. From the standpoint of the individual, pain is pain, regardless 
of the "intent" of the predator. In addition, predation is not the only way 
that one organism can have a detrimental effect on another. Indeed, one 
critical weakness of a view of nature that stresses individual rights is that it 
fails to recognize the interdependencies that exist within natural ecosystems. 
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Thus, if a population of herbivores becomes so numerous that it degrades 
its habitat, many other organisms may suffer as well. For example, elephants 
(Loxodonta a. africana) have become a serious conservation problem in 
Mrican national parks (figure 3; Van Wyk and Fairall 1969; Buechner and 
Dawkins 1961; Laws 1970; Cumming 1981). The destruction of woody vegeta-
tion by elephants is causing widespread habitat alteration, including the 
conversion of woodlands to open grassland or semi-desert. Consequently, 
many other species of animals can no longer utilize these areas, and may 
be caused to suffer as a result (Laws 1970; Pienaar 1969). Perhaps even more 
importantly, such habitat alteration increases the probability of local extinc-
tions. Those responsible for our wildlife and ecosystems are thus forced to 
make difficult decisions about how to promote the "greatest good." 
Figure 3. Elephants have become a serious conservation problem in African national 
parks. With their movements restricted by park boundaries, these large herbivores 
overgraze the vegetation and convert woodland habitats into grasslands or semi-
deserts. (Photo: Henry Klein) 
The so-called "elephant problem" is due largely to human overpopulation 
(Laws 1970). The progressive use of land by people for living space and 
agriculture has restricted many large mammals exclusively to national parks. 
One result is that elephant populations are no longer regulated by natural 
processes, such as dispersal. Thus, the animals may become so numerous 
that they degrade their own habitat. Conservationists have generally agreed 
that the only solution to this problem is culling (Caughley 1976; Haigh 
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et al. 1979; Laws 1970, 1974; Pienaar 1969; Younghusband and Myers 1986). 
Practical considerations make it difficult, if not impossible, to capture and 
translocate large numbers of adult elephants. Furthermore, most African 
national parks have more than enough elephants already, so there is really 
no place for the animals to go. (Note that immature elephants are sometimes 
captured and transported to underpopulated areas for release, see Haigh 
et al. 1979.) 
How do wildlife managers decide when intervention is required? The 
precise answer to this question may never be known (McCullough 1979; 
Noy-Meir 1981; Sinclair 1981), although some estimates have been obtained 
through mathematical modelling. At any given point in time, the biomass of 
herbivores and the biomass of the vegetation are unlikely to be in perfect 
equilibrium, and there are frequent perturbations in the system (Noy-Meir 
1981; Sinclair 1981). But, as Caughley (1970) has pointed out, unless the 
displacement becomes very large (more than 30% or so), little can be gained 
by artificial reductions of population size. If, however, the displacement from 
equilibrium is extreme, it can result in irreversible changes in vegetation 
and soils, and these are the conditions that are most likely to lead to extinc-
tions. Unfortunately, such generalizations seldom apply in specific cases. The 
degree of environmental alteration caused by grazing animals can be affected 
by many variables, such as the type of vegetation, amounts of precipitation, 
and the size of the park or reserve (Laws 1970). 
So far, we have limited our discussion to problems of overpopulation in 
indigenous animals. However, a related topic that deserves attention is that 
of introduced or "exotic" species. One of the many ways in which humans 
alter their environment is by transporting organisms across natural barriers 
to dispersal. Colonizing peoples have traditionally attempted to modify their 
new settings by releasing animals (both domestic and wild) that are native 
to their homelands (Laycock 1966). Many introduced forms have flourished 
in their new settings, and in fact there are several widespread cultivars whose 
origins are unknown, so vicarious was their dissemination. 
The introduction of exotic mammals has often been associated directly or 
indirectly with pervasive changes in native fauna and flora (Courtney 1978; 
Courtney and Ogilvie 1971; deVos and Petrides 1967; Laycock 1966; Hutchins 
et al. 1982). The problems caused by introduced species are not unlike those 
that occur when indigenous animals become overpopulated. However, 
because these organisms are not native to the host ecosystem, their destabiliz-
ing effects are often greatly accentuated. It appears that island ecosystems 
are particularly vulnerable to disruption (Coblentz 1978; Holdgate 1967). 
New Zealand, for example, is an island nation in which an assortment of 
alien herbivores (e.g., the brush-tailed possum, red deer, sika deer, and 
Himalayan tahr) have virtually annihilated the native woodland communities 
(Howard 1964, 1967; Wardle 1974). The region's natural vegetation evolved 
in the absence of heavy grazing pressure, and therefore did not develop 
chemical or physical adaptations for protection. Plants with a history of 
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exploitation by herbivores tend to evolve adaptations such as toxins, thorns, 
or rapid growth and reproductive rates to protect them from their "predators" 
Qanzen 1978; Pianka 1983). 
Conservationists have argued that populations of destructive exotics be 
controlled through culling, especially in national parks, where the animals 
are threatening native fauna and flora (Allen et al. 1981; Laycock 1966, 1984). 
Such examples illustrate the potential for conflict between the environmental! 
conservation and animal rights/welfare movements (Hutchins et al. 1982). 
Recent attempts to cull populations of feral burros in Grand Canyon National 
Park, for instance, have been opposed by animal rights/welfare advocates 
(figure 4; Laycock 1974; Stocker 1980; Reiger 1978). This occurred despite 
evidence that the foraging and trampling activities of burros are altering 
fragile desert habitats, and may be contributing to the decline of the native 
bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis) (Carothers et al. 1976; Hanley and Brady 
1977; Hansen 1980; Walters and Hansen 1978; Schectman 1978; Tennesen 
1975; U.S. Dept. of the Interior 1980). 
Figure 4. Burros were brought to North America by the Spanish in the sixteenth 
century Thousands now roam the Southwestern United States, where they compete 
with native wildlife and alter fragile desert ecosystems. (Photo: Gerry Ellis) 
Much of the controversy surrounding the artificial regulation of animal 
populations has focused on the means, rather than on the ends (Hutchins 
et al. 1982). Understandably, animal rights/welfare advocates are opposed to 
any solution which involves killing, yet current methods of population control 
may involve shooting, poisoning, trapping, or the introduction of disease 
(Anderson 1971; Fenner and Ratcliffe 1965). 
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In arguing against the control of certain exotic animals, some animal 
rights/welfare advocates have questioned whether any benefits would actually 
result from such actions. However, there are several instances in which the 
control or elimination of exotic mammals has had beneficial effects. When 
small exclosures were erected to study the effects of feral goats on native 
flora in Haleakala National Park, Hawaii, the seeds of a heretofore unknown 
leguminous plant began to germinate (Baker and Reeser 1972). Similarly, 
eradication of feral goats in the Galapagos Islands, Ecuador, resulted in the 
rapid regeneration of native plants (Hamann 1979). The elimination of feral 
rabbits from Laysan Island in the leeward Hawaiian chain saved the endemic 
Laysan teal (Anas laysanensis) from almost certain extinction (Warner 1963). 
At the time the rabbits were eliminated, the birds' population had been 
reduced to less than seven individuals. Now there is a healthy population. 
Population regulation will probably continue to be a point of contention 
between animal rights/welfare advocates and conservationists. However, 
recent technological advances may help to alleviate some of this conflict. 
There has, for example, been increasing interest in the development of 
non-lethal methods of population control, such as tubal ligation, castration, 
chemosterilization or mechanical devices that prevent conception (Davis 
1961; Johnson and Tait 1983; Matsche 1976; Singer 1975; Turner 1984). 
Implanted or orally administered hormones are commonly used to inhibit 
reproduction in zoo animals, and this has reduced the need for euthanasia 
(Seal et a!. 1976; Whitlock 1978). Unfortunately, the use of similar procedures 
for wild animals is often fraught with complications. For example, many of 
these methods require capturing and handling the animals, and this may 
lead to considerable psychological and physical trauma (figure 5; see "Con-
servation Research and Humane Concerns," below). Hormone implants and 
orally administered reproductive inhibitors often require repeated applica-
tions, sometimes on a daily basis. In addition, these methods can have many 
deleterious side effects (Matsche 1977a, 1977b, 1980; Remfrey 1978; Seal et 
a!. 1976). Methods involving surgical procedures may lead to infection or 
death (Zwank 1981). 
Even if some animals can be permanently sterilized, social factors may 
limit the effectiveness of control (Johnson and Tait 1983 ). Some rodents, for 
example, are poor candidates for the use of chemosterilants because of their 
promiscuous breeding behavior. In high density populations, a female rat 
may mate with as many as 20 different males. In fact, one study found that 
reproduction was not curtailed in a rat colony in which 85% of the males 
were surgically sterilized (Kenelly et al. 1970). Wild horses, on the other 
hand, have proven to be excellent candidates for reproductive inhibition. 
Horses are highly polygynous, and a single stallion may mate with from two 
to eleven mares. Since stallions vigorously defend their harems, the use of 
chemosterilants can have a significant impact on reproduction. One study 
obtained an 80% decrease in births by administering long-acting antifertility 
drugs to specific males (Turner 1984). Furthermore, the drugs can be injected 
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Figure 5. Biologists capture a mountain goat in Olympic National Park, Washington. 
To collect information essential to wildlife conservation it is often necessary to capture 
and handle animals or to mark them for individual identification. Despite numerous 
precautions, animals are sometimes injured during capture procedures. 
(Photo: Daryl! Hebert) 
by dartfiring rifle, thus precluding the need for capture and handling. Simi-
larly, Garrett and Franklin (1983) found that prairie dog ( Cynomys 
ludovicianus) populations could be controlled by feeding the animals estro-
gen-laced grain. These colonially living rodents are highly seasonal breeders, 
and hormones need only be administered during a short period of time to 
have a significant impact on reproduction. 
It would seem that such "benign" methods of population control offer some 
hope for compromise between the animal rights/welfare and environmental! 
conservation movements. However, reproductive inhibition is a gradual rather 
than a rapid method of control. Environmental alteration can therefore be 
expected to continue until population size eventually decreases as a result 
of natural mortality (Hutchins et al. 1982). Thus, from the perspective of the 
environmental/conservation ethic, reproductive inhibition may be a case of 
"too little, too late," especially when one is dealing with long-lived animals that 
have relatively low mortality rates. By the time population growth can be 
curtailed, irreversible environmental changes may have already taken place. 
Live capture and translocation is another non-lethal method of population 
control that is becoming increasingly popular with animal rights/welfare 
advocates. However, it also has numerous limitations. The animals are often 
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subjected to considerable physical and psychological stress while being 
captured and transported (see "Conservation Research and Humane Con-
cerns," below). Another major consideration is the fate of the animals that 
are being released. There have been few studies on this topic, but existing 
information suggests that many, if not the majority, of translocated deer die 
within a year of their release, presumably as a result of intraspecific compe-
tition (D. McCullough, personal communication). One of the most thorough 
studies on the fate of "translocated" mammals was conducted on marsupial 
gliders (Schoinobates volans) in Australia. One thousand of these animals 
were displaced to adjacent areas when their forest habitats were destroyed 
by logging (Tyndale-Briscoe and Smith 1969). A majority were recaptured 
shortly thereafter, but it was discovered that they had lost up to 25% of their 
body weight. Furthermore, many breeding females had lost their young. The 
adult mortality rate also appeared to be extremely high, as less than 7% of 
the emigrants were recaptured one year later. It was concluded ... "that dis-
placed sugar gliders die in situ rather than emigrate to occupied forest and 
die there through failure to become established" (ibid, p. 658). Thus, it is 
questionable whether translocations constitute a completely acceptable alter-
native to killing in terms of humane solutions. 
Cost is a major obstacle to capture and removal schemes; however, a 
number of animal welfare groups have offered to provide the funding. For 
example, the Fund for Animals reportedly spent nearly $500,000 to remove 
about 600 burros from Grand Canyon National Park (Newsweek 1981). These 
expenditures have been criticized as being short-sighted given the greater 
animal welfare interests that could be served if the money were used in 
other ways (Allen et al. 1981; Hutchins et al. 1982). 
Some animal rights advocates might argue that most cases of animal 
overpopulation (whether the animals are exotic or indigenous) are ultimately 
caused by humans. Furthermore, they might ask why animals should be 
made to suffer for our mistakes. Conservationists would probably sympathize 
with this view but realize that wildlife does not exist in a vacuum. There are 
few areas left in the world that are unaffected by human activity. Indeed, 
most existing national parks and reserves are smaller than San Francisco's 
man-made Golden Gate Park. The small size of these reserves, and their 
isolation, make them particularly vulnerable to ecological disruption and 
disappearance of species (Soule et al. 1979; Miller 1979; Myers 1979; Ehrlich 
and Ehrlich 1981; Polunin and Eidsvik 1979). 
To summarize, the rights view is characterized by a "laissez faire" attitude 
toward wildlife management. However, if the logic of the animal rights/ 
humane ethic is carried to its extreme, it would seem to require intervention 
when wild animals are suffering from starvation or disease (but, see Feinberg 
1978). By contrast, total non-intervention is expected to be favored by the 
environmental/conservation ethic only when remnant ecosystems are rela-
tively pristine and large enough for natural regulatory processes to operate 
(Cole 1971; Peek 1980). The environmental/conservation ethic would also 
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favor direct population reductions under certain specific circumstances. For 
example, if some human-precipitated ecological change were to drive a 
population or species close to extinction, the environmental/conservation 
ethic would favor intervention, regardless of the consequences for individual 
animals. Furthermore, direct action would be deemed justifiable when, in 
the absence of natural checks and balances, a population of animals becomes 
so large that it threatens the existence of other species, or of the ecosystem 
as a whole. From the perspective of the environmental/conservation ethic, 
direct action would be particularly justifiable in national parks, wilderness 
areas, and equivalent reserves (see Younghusband and Myers 1986). These few 
areas constitute a relatively small portion of our total land area and contain 
the only remaining habitats that are still relatively pristine (Houston 1971 ). 
Incentives for Conserving Wildlife 
Incentives for preserving natural ecosystems, endangered species, and 
wildlife in general are complex (Erhlich and Erhlich 1981). Certainly moral 
and aesthetic considerations lie at one end of the spectrum ( Gunn 1980; 
Regan 1983; Stone 1975; Blackstone 1978). More recently, however, there has 
been an increasing recognition of the economic value of wildlife and other 
natural "resources." Indeed, many conservationists and wildlife managers 
have invoked economics in an attempt to promote conservation efforts (Bart 
et al. 1979; Coe 1980; Myers 1979, 1980, 1981a; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; 
Noonan and Zagata 1982). In contrast, the rights view is vigorously opposed 
to human exploitation of sentient animals for economic gain. According to 
Regan (1983, p. 343), ''A practice, institution, enterprise, or similar undertaking 
is unjust if it permits or requires treating individuals with inherent value as 
if they were renewable resources." By contrast with the animal rights/humane 
ethic, the environmental/ conservation ethic does not seek to eliminate all 
human exploitation of animals, provided that it be accomplished as humanely 
as possible and produces minimal impact on the environment (Leopold 
1949; Myers 1979; Talbot 1980). 
Some conservationists might argue that the rights view fails to consider 
the economic and political realities in which wildlife conservation must take 
place (Wilson 1984). Indeed, there are many examples in which the recogni-
tion of animals as "renewable resources" may have saved species from 
extinction. In Papua, New Guinea, for example, people who used to kill wild 
salt water crocodiles ( Crocodylus porosus) are now raising them for sale in 
the world market (Montague 1981 ). The skins of these animals are among 
the most valuable of all crocodilians and, although they are still abundant 
in New Guinea, they have been hunted to extinction throughout most of 
their former range. Young crocodiles, which normally experience an 80% 
mortality rate in the wild, are brought into captivity, raised to optimum 
commercial size, and then killed humanely. Profits from such farming opera-
tions go directly to the local people, thus giving them an economic incentive 
for conservation. Without such rewards, there would be little chance that 
the species could survive. 
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In the above example, conservation efforts were facilitated by peoples' 
perception of animals as renewable resources. Unlike non-renewable 
resources, renewable resources carr be expected to provide long-term 
economic gains. In the absence of such attitudes, people tend to opt for 
short-term exploitation strategies, and this is more likely to lead to extinctions 
(Hardin 1978). Myers (1979) states that conservation of species must take 
place in a world dominated by politics and economics. In such a world, 
arguments based solely upon abstract philosophical notions have only limited 
effectiveness. This is particularly true in developing nations where 
impoverished people and their governments have more immediate concerns. 
To people engaged in a daily struggle for survival, an endangered animal is 
usually seen as nothing more than a source of food or income. 
Economic arguments for the preservation of species are focused on human 
needs, and such utilitarian notions about wildlife are unlikely to sit well 
with animal liberationists. Indeed, Singer (1981) has gone so far as to propose 
that the "circle of altruism" be expanded beyond our own species to all 
animals that can suffer or feel pain. Similar ideals have been expressed by 
Stone (1975), who argues that animals and, for that matter, whole ecosystems 
should be given not only moral standing but legal rights as well. Most 
conservationists would probably applaud such ideals, but there are many 
who consider them to be unrealistic. According to Wilson (1984, p. 131), 
" ... to force the argument entirely inside the flat framework of kinship and 
legal rights is to trivialize the case for conservation." Wilson believes that 
the only way to make a conservation ethic work is to "ground it in ultimately 
selfish reasoning." The essential component of this principle is that people 
will conserve land and species if they "foresee a material gain for themselves, 
their kin, and their tribe" (ibid, pp. 131-132). 
Conservationists generally do not believe that economic arguments should 
be invoked in every case. Indeed, there are many species that have no 
immediate cash value and are therefore classified as "non-resources." Thus, 
the danger in relying on economic arguments exclusively is that they might 
be effective only for a few valuable species (Ehrenfeld 1976; Leopold 1949; 
Myers 1979). Alternatively, certain valuable species may be poorly managed 
or over-exploited, thus hastening their extinction (see Domalain 1977). Con-
servationists are aware of these problems, and realize that economic argu-
ments are but one of the many potential strategies in the struggle to preserve 
biological diversity (Ehrlich 1980). 
Conservation Research and Humane Concems 
Scientific research is one means by which humans gain an understanding 
of the natural world. Such an understanding is essential to wildlife conserva-
tion efforts. In fact, Poole and Trefethen (1978, p. 344) have stated that 
"Knowledge is the essential prerequisite to making a management decision 
respecting a species, population, or group of wildlife." A decision made in 
the absence of information about a species or population, depending on the 
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result, is, at worst, an act of ignorance, or, at best, a stroke of good fortune." 
With this in mind, it is important to ask: How should we view conservation 
research that harms individual animals? 
Animal rights/welfare advocates have been traditionally opposed to the 
use of animals in biomedical research, particularly when individuals are 
sacrificed, or caused to suffer pain (March 1984; Singer 1975; Regan 1983). 
Indeed, Regan (1983, p. 385) has stated that" ... animals are not to be treated 
as mere receptacles or as renewable resources. Thus does the practice of 
scientific research on animals violate their rights. Thus it ought to cease, 
according to the rights view." 
By contrast with the animal rights/humane ethic, the more holistic environ-
mental/conservation ethic would not oppose the use of animals in scientific 
research, particularly if such research were to help ensure the survival of a 
population,species, or ecosystem as a whole. However, animal rights advo-
cates would consider this view to be "utilitarian," in that "whether the harm 
done to individual animals in the pursuit of scientific ends is justified depends 
on the balance of the aggregated consequences for all those affected by the 
outcome" (Regan 1983, p. 392). 
There are many cases in which conservation research may prove harmful 
to individual animals. For example, to collect essential data on population 
dynamics, behavior, individual growth patterns, diseases, etc., it is often 
necessary to capture and handle animals, or to mark them for individual 
identification (figure 5; Taber and Cowan 1971). Despite numerous precau-
tions by scientists, animals are sometimes injured or killed during capture 
procedures (Spraker 1978). For example, some animals suffer limb fractures 
and lesions as a result of falls, and some may succumb to an overdose of 
drugs or to shock (Stelfox 1976). Others may contract capture myopathy-an 
often fatal muscular disorder that is induced by the trauma of capture and 
transport (Chalmers and Barrett 1977; Spraker 1977, 1978). 
Harm that comes to individual animals during capture and handling could 
be considered "accidental," in that scientists are not harming animals delib-
erately. However, there are cases in which conservation research may involve 
deliberate harm. For example, thousands of animals have been sacrificed so 
that biologists could analyze their stomach contents (e.g., Peterson 1955), 
or assess their physical condition or reproductive status (e.g., Parker 1981; 
Sinclair 1974). Another example is provided by the work of Eaton (1972a, 
1972b ), who studied the development of predatory behavior in captive-reared 
lions (Panthera leo) and cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus). To observe predation, 
he released live domestic goats, which were subsequently killed and eaten 
by the cats. The rights view certainly would not condone such experiments, 
yet, despite the unfortunate consequences for the individual goats, this work 
appears to be compatible with the more holistic environmental/conservation 
ethic. Many carnivorous species, including large predatory cats, have been 
forced to the brink of extinction by people (Stonehouse 1981). One method by 
which conservationists hope to save some of these species is through captive 
128 li-1:. Hutchins and C. Wemmer 
breeding and reintroduction (Brambell1977). However, reintroducing captive-
bred animals into their natural habitats poses many difficult problems, incluc!-
ing the ability of the animals to obtain their own food. Although young felids 
come equipped with an "instinctive" sequence of predatory behaviors, prac-
tice is necessary to increase efficiency (Leyhausen 1973). Live prey can be 
both unpredictable and dangerous and efficiency is important. Thus, a knowl-
edge of how captive-bred predators learn to recognize potential prey, and 
how predatory behavior improves with practice, will be essential to any 
serious reintroduction effort (Bogue and Ferrari 1976). 
The rights view would place heavy restrictions on the nature of conservation 
research. If carried to its logical extreme, it would, in fact, eliminate all 
science "that violates individual rights" (Regan 1983). One implication is that 
information essential to wildlife conservation could not be collected, and 
this might increase the probability of species extinctions. Animal rights/ 
welfare advocates might argue that scientists should work to develop more 
benign methods of study In fact, scientists themselves have taken some 
initiative in this regard. There have, for example, been efforts to develop 
alternatives to tagging, branding, toe-clipping, and other types of identification 
techniques which involve harming animals (Ryder 1978). In addition, there 
has been an increased interest in the development of less invasive methods 
of assessing physical condition and diets. For example, physical condition 
can sometimes be assessed through measurements of weight, girth, blood 
chemistry, and horn growth rates (Bunnell 1978; Franzmann and LaResche 
1978; Stevens 1983; Winters 1980). Similarly, dietary preferences can some-
times be determined by watching what animals eat (e.g., Hoeffs 1974), by 
analyzing feces (e.g., Owaga 1977), or by measuring the nutritional quality 
or abundance of the food resources themselves (e.g., Constan 1972; Miller 
1974). The humane treatment of animals is therefore a continuing goal. 
However, it may not be possible to totally avoid suffering and pain. The 
problem of disappearing species is so acute and so immediate that there 
may not always be sufficient time to devote to such tasks. 
Conclusions 
Clearly, there are many cases in which the animal rights/humane ethic is 
in direct conflict with the environmental/conservation ethic. In fact, we 
consider the extreme views expressed by Singer (1975) and Regan (1983) 
to be largely incompatible with the goal of wildlife conservation. We agree 
with Wilson's (1984, p. 131) conclusion that the animal rights/welfare move-
ment is due for "a stiffer dose of biological realism." In fact, the only major 
implication of modern biology that the humane moralists seem to have 
embraced is that of the evolutionary continuity between human beings and 
other forms of life (Callicott 1980). A recognition of our kinship with all 
living things is often used to argue that some nonhumans deserve "equal 
rights" (Singer 1981). However, other, less palatable, implications of the more 
holistic ecological! evolutionary perspective appear to have been conveniently 
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ignored, especially when they conflict with the philosophic foundations of 
the animal rights/humane ethic (Callicott 1980; Rodman 1977). 
As mentioned earlier, one of the major problems with the animal rights/ 
humane ethic is its focus on individual animals, as opposed to populations, 
species, or ecosystems. This reductionistic perspective of the natural world 
is biologically naive, and may itself be based on the cultural biases of its 
progenitors (Gunn 1980). Western cultures do tend to place more emphasis 
on the rights of individuals, as opposed to the welfare of society as a whole. 
Animal liberation is therefore an anthropomorphic philosophy (Rodman 
1977), and this may explain some of its popular appeal. But what are the 
dangers of adopting a view of nature which is focused on the rights of 
individual organisms? 
Myers ( 1979) and Ehrlich and Ehrlich ( 1981) have identified habitat destruc-
tion as the most significant threat to wild animal populations. Therefore, a 
concern for wild animals needs to be expressed in a willingness to protect 
natural ecosystems. On a superficial level animals appear to be separate 
entities, moving independently and freely within their environments. In fact, 
nothing could be further from the truth. All free-living organisms are closely 
tied to the habitats in which they have evolved. It is therefore difficult to 
separate individuals from their ecological contexts (Fox 1979). Similarly, it 
is equally difficult to draw strong distinctions between living and nonliving 
things. All living organisms, whether they be viruses or humans, are composed 
of non-living matter. Carnivores, for example, are as dependent on soils for 
their existence as they are on their prey. 
In simple terms, an ecosystem must consist of a source of energy (usually 
sunlight), a source of raw chemical materials (rocks, soil, air, and water), 
"producers" capable of transforming and storing solar energy (usually green 
plants), "primary consumers" which feed on the producers (i.e., herbivores), 
"secondary consumers," which feed on the primary consumers (i.e., carni-
vores) and, finally, decomposers which break down the dead bodies of the 
producers and consumers and cycle their energy back into the system (Das-
mann 1978). According to Leopold (1949), such "food chains are the living 
channels which conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to the 
soil ... like a slowly augmented revolving fund of life." The rights view simply 
cannot deal with such complex interdependencies. To quote Rodman (1979, 
p. 89), "The moral atomism that focuses on animals and their subjective 
experiences does not seem well adapted to coping with ecological systems." 
The humane moralists are very specific about which forms of life are to 
be granted full moral consideration. Indeed, many ardent defenders of animal 
rights have focused exclusively on the protection of sentient animals, and 
often their attention is concentrated only on those animals that are perceived 
as being appealing or "cute" (Neitschmann 1977; Rodman 1977). Fox (1979) 
has recognized the apparent weakness of this philosophy, noting that "The 
ecological imperative of responsible stewardship concerns our relationship 
with all of creation, both sentient and non-sentient" (p. 54). He envisions 
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the animal welfare movement as being an important transition to a more 
holistic "eco-ethic." While we agree that a recognition of the "rights" of all 
living things is an important step toward the attainment of such a goal, we 
also stress that responsible stewardship may involve difficult, and sometimes 
painful decisions (see Fox 1978; Hutchins et al. 1982). In some cases, our 
actions may result in the death or suffering of other sentient beings. Of 
course, this does not imply that animals can be treated without care and 
respect. For example, when the need to control an animal population has 
been identified, it should be accomplished in the most humane manner 
possible, given the limitations of the situation. However, when the purpose 
of such reductions is to preserve natural ecosystems or to protect endangered 
animals or plants, then it should not be perceived as being "inhumane." 
Regan (1983) has labelled any attempt to subvert the rights of individual 
organisms to the species or ecosystem as "environmental fascism." However, 
the more appropriate term might be "environmental socialism," in that the 
"rights" of individual animals are viewed as secondary to those of the species 
or ecosystem as a whole. From the perspective of the environmental/conser-
vation ethic, the species and ecosystem are more important than any one 
organism. Indeed, without the former, there is no way that the latter could 
even exist! As Soule and Wilcox (1980, p. 8) have pointed out, "Death is one 
thing-an end to birth is something else." In fact, if animal rights/welfare 
advocates are unwilling to broaden their perspective to encompass the whole 
of nature, they will risk a total alienation of the environmental community. 
Moreover, "in adhering to a philosophy that emphasizes a reverence for life, 
but that ignores the conditions necessary for its survival, they may ultimately 
be unfaithful to their own ideals" (Hutchins et al. 1982, p. 333). In this 
respect, radical animalliberationists may have much in common with certain 
Hindu castes. Based on his travels in India, Sanderson (1896, p. 160) once 
wrote that "Many natives would not hurt the meanest insect: but though it 
might be merciful to put an end to suffering in many cases they cannot part 
from their disinclination to take life." The frustration of the colonial British 
with Hindu ethics illustrates an important point: A belief system that protects 
a well-meaning person's conscience may in fact perpetuate a greater suffering 
unknown to him or her (also see Rodman 1979; Callicott 1980). 
Conservationists and animal liberationists have challenged our traditional 
perceptions of non-human animals (Wilson 1984). However, the latter view 
is biologically illiterate and thus ill-equipped to provide an intelligent basis 
for wildlife conservation. This is not to imply that our relationship with 
nature should never be approached in moral terms. In fact, ethical philosophy 
faces a severe test when it comes to the conservation problem. As Wilson 
(1984, p. 123) has written, " ... in ecological and evolutionary time, good 
does not automatically flow from good or evil from evil. To choose what is 
best for the near future is easy To choose what is best for the distant future 
is also easy But to choose what is best for both the near future and distant 
future is a hard task, often internally contradictory, and requiring ethical 
codes yet to be formulated." 
Wildlife Conservation 131 
Epilogue 
The objective of this paper was to compare the animal rights/humane and 
environmental/conservation ethics, and review potential conflicts. Though it is 
clear that there are significant differences in values, it is also clear that the 
two views are not completely antithetical. The primary difference between the 
two ethics lies in the scope and the primacy of their concerns. We hope, how-
ever, that this essay has not been a purely intellectual exercise, and would 
therefore like to explore the potential for reconciliation. Indeed, we believe 
that a shared appreciation of those values held in common could lead to 
productive compromises benefiting both wildlife and environment. As it is 
now, there is a strong element of evangelism among animal rights/humane 
proponents which views any compromise as concession, and an equally 
stubborn element exists among certain environmental/ conservation groups. 
Enlightened solutions to the problems of the humane treatment of animals 
and environmental concern can best be achieved through collaboration. 
Participation in cooperative problem solving through regular meetings, work-
shops, and symposia should enhance awareness of concerns vital to each 
group's interests. This is a significant challenge which has yet to be confronted 
on a useful scale. Already there have been some efforts, such as the interna-
tional workshop on the problem of overabundant animals Qewell et al. 1981). 
Cooperation will also permit the pooling of resources necessary to test the 
efficacy of humane alternatives to conventional, but disputed animal manage-
ment techniques. Success in achieving mutually acceptable solutions will 
depend on strong and enlightened leadership on both sides, which shares 
the conviction that lasting solutions to complex problems cannot be found 
in isolation. 
If we are truly concerned about the welfare of wild animals, we must also 
begin to question our own behavior. For example, some animal rights/welfare 
advocates have expressed their concern for animals by attempting to thwart 
recreational hunters (Reinecke 1983). Yet, in comparison with other, more 
"subtle" human activities, properly regulated hunting has little impact on 
animal welfare or wildlife conservation efforts. In fact, the long-term goals 
of conservationists and animal liberationists would best be served by radical 
changes in human life-styles (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; Myers 1981b). The 
two greatest challenges facing preservationists today are: (1) the selfish, 
materialistic, and often wasteful attitudes prevalent in developed nations, 
like the United States, and (2) rampant population growth in the so-called 
Third World countries (Ehrlich 1980). Movement toward a steady state eco-
nomy and zero population growth would do more for the welfare of animals 
than all our other efforts combined. If current trends in human population 
growth and habitat destruction continue, we could lose nearly one million 
species of animals and plants in the next two decades alone (Myers 1979, 
1985; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981). This fact makes it even more essential that 
those who care about wildlife and nature, and those who care about the 
rights of individual animals close ranks to do battle with a common enemy. 
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